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CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND DISCRIMINATION: 
SAMOANS BEFORE A PUBLIC HOUSING EVICTION BOARD 
Justice wears a blindfold. There is no subtle point here, As thinkers from 
Weber (1968) to Luhmam (1988) have recognized the law's ideal is to decide cases 
in terms of its own categories (which Justice presumably holds in her head). Such 
socially defined categories as race, religion and social status are seldom recognized 
in the law and when not recognized should play no role in legal decision making. 
Yet there is a feeling that Justice occasionally peeks, and numbers of studies of 
judicial decision making have tried to catch her in the act. 
Usually these studies focus on race, for in the United States racial prejudice 
seems so powerful and ubiquitous that it is difficult to believe that court decisions 
would not reflect racial bias. In some instances bias is clear. When it was 
permissible to punish rape with death, for example, the punishment was largely 
limited to Southern states and within those states it was ordinarily reserved for 
black men who had raped white women. Indeed, to judge by the punishment 
statistics one would believe that no white man ever raped a black woman 
(Wolfgang 1973). In most investigations, however, Justice has fared remarkably 
well, given that expectations of a strong racial influence are not unreasonable. 
Discrimination appears either to be too complex or indirect to be categorized as 
simple racial bias or it is not found in the data. Thus in the capital punishment 
area Garfinkel's (1949) early finding of discrimination based.on the victim's race1 
has been replicated in a number of recent, more sophisticated studies, but outside 
of the rape area the evidence suggesting discrimination based on the defendant's 
race or even on the interaction between the defendant's race and the victim's race2 
is ordinarily weak or ambiguous (Paternoster 1987, Baldus and Cole 1990, Gross 
and Mauro 1989). With respect to other crimes and judicial actions the evidence 
after controlling for legally relevant variables is, as Hagan and Bumiller's (1983) 
review of the sentencing literature indicates, inconsistent. Many studies find no 
evidence of discrimination, many find that blacks are treated worse than whites, 
and some find that blacks receive lighter sentences. Moreover, when racial effects 
are found they are almost inevitably quite weak and dwarfed by such "legitimate" 
factors as offense seriousness and prior record.3 Results are similar in studies of 
1 Those who kill whites are more likely to be sentenced.to death than those who kill blacks. 
The expectation would be that as  in rape blacks who assault whites would be punished more 
severely than defendants in any other criminal-victim combination. 
3 These results do not mean there is no discrimination in the criminal justice system. Most 
sentencing studies have not controlled adequately for selection bias (Klepper et a1 1983), and 
indirect or institutional racism can also explain null results. With respect to the first issue racial 
discrimination a t  the early levels of criminal justice processing (e.g. arrest, decision to charge) may 
mean that whites who reach the sentencing stage are, on a variety of consequential but 
unmeasured variables, guilty of more heinous offenses than blacks. If so, equal sentences across 
races would actually 'evidence racial discrimination. With respect to the institutional racism issue, 
it may be that blacks are for reasons of discrimination more likely than whites to be poor 
sentencing risks. For example, if unemployed whites and unemployed blacks receive the same 
other court decisions such as conviction (Warren 1974, LaFree 1980) and bail 
setting (Nagel 1983). 
The ideology of blind justice applies to informal courts as well as to formal 
ones. Indeed, informal neighborhood tribunals have sometimes been defended on 
the grounds that dispute settlement is fairer when the judges share the disputants' . 
cultural understandings (Danzig 1973), and advocates of small claims courts 
claimed that they were needed to provide litigants in the lower socio-economic 
classes with meaningful access to courts. Similarly the critique of institutions of 
informal justice has often involved theoretical (Abel 1982) or empirical (Moulton 
1968) arguments that poor people are systematically disadvantaged in these 
settings. However, there has been virtually no research searching for racial 
discrimination in such institutions. Yngvesson and Hennesy, for example (1975), 
in their synthesis of the small claims court literature . report . no study that focused 
on racial discrimination and in Abel's (1982) The Politics of Informal Justice the 
index to the essays on "The American Experience" contain no headings for 
"discrimination", "race" or "racism. "4 
As a theoretical matter it would not be surprising to find that racial biases 
motivate decisions in informal courts. Indeed, one might expect to see stronger 
race effects in informal courts than in formal ones because the very features that 
make for judicial formality are designed to limit the influence of such legally 
irrelevant factors as the personal characteristics of parties. Informal courts, on 
the other hand, often make a virtue of treating litigants as people, and an 
individual's racial identity is an inescapable part of what he or she is as a person. 
I t  would be particularly unsurprising if tribunals that used citizen judges were to 
show racial biases, for as Donald Black (1971) long ago demonstrated in his study 
of arrest, when legal decisions turn on popular input, those decisions will reflect 
the preferences of those who provide that input.5 
In this paper we examine the decision making of an informal tribunal; the 
Hawaiian Housing Authority's (HHA) eviction board. We begin in a fashion that 
is conventional in studies searching for discrimination. We develop a model of 
measurable variables that might influence board decision making regardless of the 
defendant's identity. We also include in the model a dummy variable that 
captures membership in the group that is the hypothesized target of discrimination 
(in our case Samoans). Should we find a significant negative coefficient on the 
dummy variables we can conventionally treat i t  as evidence of discrimination; if 
sentence increment a s  a result of the recidivisin risks suggested by unemployment, the 
comparative sentencing data will reveal no race-based discrimination. The fact that blacks are 
unemployed may, however, result from workplace discrimination. 
Volume 2 of Abel's book which presents "Comparative Studies" has a heading for "racism" in 
its index, with respect to Mozambique colonial courts. 
Black found that the tendency of police to respect a complainant's wishes led the police, other 
things being equal, to arrest a higher proportion of blacks who were complained about than of 
whites. Interestingly this occurred because black complainants were more likely to seek the arrest 
of black trouble makers than white complainants were to seek the arrest of white trouble makers. 
The effects of complaints in cross-race situations were not investigated. If they had been, the 
racial effect might have increased because white complainants might have been especially likely to 
seek the arrest of black trouble makers. 
the coefficient is small and not si@icant convention suggests that we are not 
confronting a discriminatory process. 
This approach to spotting discrimination treats discrimination as a residual 
category. To use ethnic discrimination as an example, if a substantial bivariate 
relationship exists between ethnicity and adverse outcomes, the conventional 
approach does not treat that relationship as evidence of discrimination unless it 
persists when the influence of factors that one might suppose would affect the 
decision regardless of the party's ethnicity are also taken into account. When, 
however, ethnicity does add significantly to the ability of other variables to predict 
adverse outcomes, we regard that as evidence of ethnic discrimination and are 
more certain the more adequately we have accounted for variables other than 
ethnicity that might plausibly have affected the decision in question. 
This conventional approach does not, however allow one to trace out all the 
disadvantaging implications of ethnicity no matter how adequately the variables 
that might plausibly influence the decision maker are identified and measured. 
First, there is the familiar problem of institutional discrimination. A sentencing 
judge, for example, may weigh a defendant's prior arrests the same regardless of 
the race of the defendant before her. However, discriminatory decisions by police 
or complainants may mean that the typical black defendant had more or more 
serious prior arrests than the typical white defendant. Second there is cultural 
discrimination, a phenomenon seldom recognized in studies of discriminatory legal 
decision making. A decision maker may value certain behaviors and disvalue 
others regardless of the ethnic identity of the person exhibiting them. But the 
decision maker's values may reflect her cultural roots and she may fail to respect 
or even to recognize the ways in which the behavior of others is tied into a 
different cultural value system. For example, a state legislature may make it 
illegal for a parent to withdraw a youth from school before age 16 and the state's 
judges may punish Amish parents who violate the law in the same way they 
would punish non-Amish parents. Not only does the law and its enforcement fail 
to respect the reasons why Amish beliefs counsel against schooling past the eighth 
grade (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 1972), i t  also fails to recognize that 
schooling until a t  least age 16 came to seem "natural" to the state's citizens only 
when urbanization and the mechanization of agriculture reduced the value of child 
labor, relative to that of more educated adults. Thus both the makers and 
enforcers of the compulsory schooling law act without reflecting on the possibility 
that, if agricultural production statewide were technologically similar to that of 
the Amish, withdrawing children from school at age 14 might seem natural. 
The word "discrimination" has, of course, taken on a pejorative connotation, 
and there is some question as to whether one should label the kind of cultural 
domination we identify "discrimination." For most legal purposes unless actors 
are responding to tokens of group membership with an intent to disadvantage 
group members one does not have legally remediable discrimination. Moreover, 
the moral status of a person who intends harm to another because of group 
membership is certainly different than that of a person who believes she is 
responding to a characteristic other than group membership and may not even be 
aware of how cultural differences influence her actions. The net result of cultural 
discrimination may, however, create a pattern of group disadvantage similar to 
what one would expect if discrimination were intentional, and the law allows clear 
patterns of group-linked disadvantage to be taken as evidence that discrimination 
is intentional.6 
In what follows, we begin our search for discrimination in conventional 
fashion by presenting quantitative models of eviction board decisions. Controlling 
for a variety of relevant variables we find that Samoan ethnicity is not associated 
with the probability of eviction in cases brought for nonfinancial reasons, but it is 
positively associated with the chances of eviction in cases brought for financial 
reasons. 'The significant positive coefficient on the "Samoan" variable in cases 
brought for non-payment of rent or other financial debts suggests that Samoans 
are discriminated against because of their ethnicity. This is consistent with some 
qualitative evidence we gathered by interviewing almost everyone who, over the 
twenty year period we examine, had a decision making role in the eviction process. 
However, the greater portion of the qualitative evidence appears inconsistent with 
the simple discrimination hypothesis, for decision makers can point to reasons 
other than ethnicity for disproportionately evicting Samoans. These reasons often 
appear legally adequate and are not captured in our quantitative model. Taking 
these reasons into account, we cannot say that Samoans suffer a residual 
disadvantage that can only be explained by their ethnicity. Thus by the standards 
that guide most conventional searches for discrimination in legal decision making, 
we cannot say that Samoans have been discriminated against. 
But pushing the level of investigation to yet another level, a different 
picture emerges. The disadvantages Samoans suffer appear in large measure 
attributable to behavior that members of other ethnic groups are unlikely to 
engage in and, more importantly, to excuses that members of other ethnic groups 
'are unlikely to give. These behaviors and excuses in turn reflect aspects of 
Samoan culture that are either not recognized or not respected by the members of 
the dominant culture who judge Samoan tenants. Thus Samoans are 
systematically disadvantaged in the eviction process because of their ethnic 
heritage. Yet even this view holds dangers of misleading. As a final complication 
we describe two cases which illustrate that, when cultural understandings differ, it 
may be difficult for members of a dominant culture to ascertain what 
disadvantaging behavior should count as discrimination.7 
In examining how Samoans fare before an eviction board, we are looking a t  
an unfamiliar minority group before an unusual court. Nonetheless, what we 
learn should be of more than specialized interest. The different layers we unpeel 
in our search for discrimination caution against too facilely accepting the 
6 As a clear pattern of group-linked disadvantage becomes visible a decision maker may become 
aware that a characteristic she was responding to was proxying for group membership. In these 
circumstances a continued response to that characteristic may have an element of intentional 
discrimination. A key issue is the legitimacy of resting the disadvantage on the characteristic 
responded to. Thus an employer must prove the job-related validity of an employment test if that 
test disproportionately screens out members of some cognizable group but not otherwise G a g u ~  
Duke Power, #Jl U.S. 424, 1971). 
One might, for example, reasonably suspect that white teachers label black students as 
"disruptive" in part because they fail to appreciate aspects of black culture. However, Farkas and 
his colleagues in a study of one large Southwestern school district, found that black teachers were 
substantially more likely than white teachers to label black students disruptive (Farkas et al. 
1990). 
conclusions of studies limited to data that is less rich. The kinds of cultural 
discrimination that we can spot because of the distance between the Samoan and 
the dominant culture is also likely to exist in other situations where members of 
one group pass judgment on members of another. If the effects of such 
discrimination are less pronounced where cultures are more similar, discrimination 
will-be harder to discern. 
The legal decisions we examine in this paper are decisions of the Honolulu 
Housing Authority's (HHA) eviction board during the years 1966-1985. This 
board consisted of a group of citizen-volunteers whose assent was necessary before 
the HHA could proceed to evict tenants. We have described this board and the 
HHA's eviction process and the way each changed over time in other publications 
(Lempert 1989, Lempert and Monsma 1988, Monsma and Lempert in press). 
Here we will only mention those details that are important in understanding what 
follows. 
Throughout the period 1966-1985 procedures before the eviction board were 
informal. Tenants appeared, usually without lawyers. The Authority's case was 
briefly presented, usually by questioning the project manager, and the tenant was 
allowed to respond in whatever way she wanted. Almost always the Authority's 
charges were admitted. In three quarters of the cases the charge was non- 
payment of rent and the fact of non-payment was almost always indisputable, but 
even when some other lease violation, like fighting or keeping pets, was charged, 
the tenant usually admitted the violation but sought to excuse it. After the tenant 
replied, usually with explanations, promises or excuses, board members, the 
Authority's prosecutor and occasionally the project manager often asked the tenant 
questions. Board members on occasions also lectured the tenant, either scolding 
- her for her failings or offering her advice about how to deal with her situation or 
how to keep from getting in trouble in the future. Throughout the tone was 
informal. Dress was usually casual, the tenant's children might be sitting on her 
lap or playing on the meeting room floor, and there was considerable effort to 
ensure that the tenant understood what was being said. The time of the typical 
hearing, between twenty and thirty minutes, appears generous when compared to 
the typical hearings of some small claims courts (Conley and O'Barr 1990) and 
misdemeanor trial courts (Mileski 197 1). 
While the informality of the basic hearing remained more or less the same 
over time, other features of the eviction process and the board's decision making 
changed. Interested readers will find the changes described in detail in Lempert 
(1989). For present purposes it is enough to know that the "Period" variable in 
the models we present is designed to capture significant differences over time in 
., board procedures and the environment in which the board operated. 
The data we work with are drawn from the HHA's files on every eviction 
action brought between the years 1966 and 1985. These records include 
information on the hearings and their outcomes, appeals and their outcomes, the 
amount of rent owed, and a number of other possibly relevant variables such as 
family composition, the age and marital status of family members, whether a 
family was receiving welfare, legal representation, family income and the 
occurrence of various kinds of trouble, such as illness or unemployment. 
The Authority's eviction files sometimes included information on ethnicity, 
but most files did not have ethnicity information. Where ethnicity was not 
reflected in the Authority's file, we coded ethnicity into two categories, Samoan or 
non-Samoan, based on first and last names. Married couples were coded as 
Samoan if either partner had a Samoan names. The coding was done by a 
research assistant native to Hawaii and conversant with island culture. Since 
Samoan names are usually distinctive we have some confidence in this coding. By 
coding a tenant as Samoan if only the first name was Samoan we included some 
Samoans of mixed parentage, but we will have missed any Samoans of mixed 
parentage whose first and last names were non-Samoan in origin. We do not 
believe that these procedures cause important biases, for misclassification is likely 
to dampen any effects we find. 
In addition to the information we collected from the Authority's files we 
interviewed almost everyone in Hawaii in 1987 who had been connected with the 
eviction process from 1966 on. This included most eviction board members, project 
managers, HHA prosecutors, lawyers who appeared occasionally as defense 
counsel and HHA central office officials who served during the period for which we 
have eviction file data. Thus we can complement our file data with information 
about the observations and attitudes of those who, apart from the ever-changing 
tenants, figured most prominently in the eviction process. 
Our data do not allow us to determine whether the eviction board treated 
members of ethnic groups other than Samoan better or worse than might be 
expected on the basis of tenant and case characteristics, but there is reason to 
believe that if ethnicity adversely affected a tenant's prospects before the board, 
these effects were limited to Samoans and perhaps one or two other ethnic groups 
that were present in public housing in much smaller numbers. The first reason is 
simply what people told us in their interviews. Problems with Samoans were 
often spontaneously raised. Only three other ethnic groups were similarly . 
mentioned, Laotians, Vietnamese and Tongans, and there were far more mentions 
of Samoans than of these groups. Indeed, when these other groups were 
mentioned, it was usually in conjunction with Samoans. Tensions between the 
Vietnamese and Laotians on the one hand and Samoans on the other were 
mentioned by several informants, and one or two informants linked Tongans and 
Samoans together in discussing problems of Polynesian peoples. 
The second reason is that Samoa-ns in Hawaii have many of the 
characteristics of an underclass. Their per capita income is the lowest of any 
ethnic group in Hawaii for which separate statistics are kept (Kincaid & Yum 
1987, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1979). Samoan women are less likely to 
work than women of any other ethnic group (Hect e t  al. 1986). Their average 
education is low, with more than half of the Samoan adults in Hawaii having nine 
years of school or less (Baker 1986). Unemployment rates are high (Hect et al. 
1986, Grekska et al. 1986). A disproportionate number of Hawaii's Samoans are 
in prison (Howard 1986), and Samoans generally are regarded as a violent and 
dangerous people (Howard 1986, Hect et  al. 1986). Indeed, even among 
California's Samoan immigrants it is recognized that "Samoans in Hawaii are 
stigmatized" (Janes 1990). Finally, a study of the opinions held of each other by 
five Hawaiian ethnic groups (Caucasians, Japanese Americans, and immigrant 
generation Filipinos, Vietnamese and Samoans), including three of low income and 
status, revealed that among all groups except their own, Samoans were a t  the 
bottom when moral traits such as industriousness %ere measured along semantic 
differentials. Except for Samoans, whose average ranking on the six measured 
dimensions was close to the neutral point, these Hawaiian ethnic groups had 
generally positive stereotypes of each other (Yum & Wang 1983). 
Thus we expected that if we were to find any discrimination by the eviction 
board on the basis of ethnicity, it would involve discrimination against Samoans. 
Other ethnic groups did not seem objectively to be as poorly off as the Samoans 
and did not seem to be as stigmatized. 
Overall Samoans account for about 21% of the eviction actions the 
Authority commenced by subpoena and for about the same proportion of cases in 
which hearings were held.8 Because we do not have data on the ethnic 
composition of the Authority's projects, we cannot say whether Samoans are 
disproportionately represented in these data. The proportion of actions involving 
Samoans is far higher after 1982 than before. This may reflect an increase in the 
proportion of Samoan tenants, but the bulk of the upsurge is probably due to an 
increase in the speed with which the HHA processed non-payment cases. For 
reasons that will become clear, we think Samoans are more likely than other 
tenants to have family or church networks they can draw on for financial support 
if given enough time to mobilize aid. ,. 
Table 1 compares the reasons why eviction actions were brought against 
Samoans and other tenants. Samoans were more likely than other tenants to be 
subpoenaed for fraud or non-payment of rent and less likely to be subpoenaed for 
pet violations. The difference in fraud subpoenas may reflect the fact that many 
Samoan tenants spoke English poorly or not a t  all. Very often when fraud, which 
- usually iilvolved the concealment of income, was charged, the tenant's defense 
A' 
' would be that she didn't understand that certain income had to be reported. In 
the case of Samoans this defense might have in fact explained some cases, since 
language problems may have prevented clear understandings. In the late 1970s 
there were a t  least two instances where tenants avoided eviction hearings by 
prevailing in grievance arbitration with a defense of failure to understand. 
The proportion of cases brought for non-payment of rent may be slightly 
higher among Samoans than in other ethnic groups because Samoans in the 
United States often face demands for money which they do not feel they can resist. 
Samoan families that help members emigrate to the United States often expect 
regular cash remittances in return (Holmes 1974), and all Samoan families expect 
that even distant members will help with cash contributions on special occasions 
such as funerals and weddings (Ablon 1970, 1971). Churches too make regular 
financial demands and these are especially important institutions for many 
emigrant Samoans. Thus Samoans are more likely than other tenants to find 
themselves in a position where social pressures induce them to spend a portion of 
their rent budget for other purposes.9 
Hearings might not be held because a tenant moved out upon receiving a subpoena or because 
the problem was resolved without a hearing and the Authority chose to cancel the action. Of 1268 
cases commenced by subpoena, 1007 had a board hearing. 
In traditional Samoa, Samoans are very closely bound to their aiga or extended family group, 
and the head of the family, or matai, will largely control the resources family members possess 
and the things family members do. Even though these traditional arrangements are breaking 
down particularly in American Samoa with the growth of wage labor and a cash economy, 
extended family connections and status within the extended family are still important to most 
Samoans. In the United States there is an effort to reconstruct the aigi as best possible, but 
families will be split and the matai may remain in Samoa. In these circumstances the church 
The tendency for propensity of Samoans to be subpoenaed for financial 
reasons, which is to say for fraud and non-payment, is not explained by factors 
that changed over time. The percentage of cases brought for financial reasons is 
higher among Samoans than among non-Samoans in each of the periods that 
captures important changes in the eviction process over time. 
The low percentage of pet cases is probably the result of three factors. 
First; keeping dogs as pets (and almost all pet cases involve dogs) is a not a 
Samoan custom. Second, Samoans are more likely than most tenants to live in 
the HHA's one low-income high rise, a living arrangement that is not conducive to 
keeping pets. And third, many of the pet cases arose during the earlier time 
periods when a lower proportion of public housing tenants were Samoan. 
As a first step in determining whether Samoans, when they are subpoenaed 
to appear before the eviction board, suffer any discrimination we present a series 
of probit models using as controls the variables defined in Table 2. Several of 
these variables were not coded for cases before 1969 and were coded for only a 
random sample of cases for the years 1979 through 1985. We have used the 
smaller sample with more complete information for this analysis. In all models 
the data are weighted to reflect the composition of all cases for the 1969 through 
1985 period. We analyze these data separately for financial violations and for 
other reasons for action. 
Table 3 presents a probit model for the chances of eviction in cases brought 
for reasons other than non-payment or fraud. The weak and non-significant 
coefficient for the Samoan dummy variable in this model provides little evidence 
that Samoans are discriminated against in these kinds of cases. 
Table 4 presents probit models for the likelihood of eviction in financial 
violation cases. In addition to the control variables used for the model in Table 3, 
Table 4 includes some variables, such as the amount of money owed, that are only 
relevant for financial violation cases. The coefficient for the Samoan variable in 
Model 1 is positive and statistically significant, indicating that, controlling for 
other variables in the equation, Samoans were more likely than non-Samoans to 
be evicted. The estimated Samoan effect is strong enough to make a substantial 
difference in a family's chances of eviction. For a case that, based on the control 
variables, has an estimated probability of eviction equal to the overall (weighted) 
average of .326, being Samoan .increases the estimated probability of eviction to 
.4.73. 
The degree of discrimination against Samoans may have changed over time. 
Model 2 includes terms for the interaction of Samoan and period. The three 
interaction coefficients are contrasts between the Samoan effect during the period 
in question and the Samoan effect during the sixth period. The estimated Samoan 
effects increase across periods, hinting that discrimination against Samoans 
increased over time. The estimates provide no more than a hint of interaction, 
however, because whether tak n individually or jointly, they are nonsignificant 
(for joint test of signifkance X~ = 35 ,  3 d.f.). 
helps fill the family leadership vacuum, and ministers will be accorded some of the respect that in 
Samoa goes to the Matai (Janes 1990). 
One way in which the board may discriminate against Samoans is by 
applying the criteria used to determine evictability more strictly to Samoans than 
to tenants of other ethnic backgrounds. Given reactions to how Samoans handle 
money or a general prejudice against Samoans, the board may hold Samoans to 
higher financial standards than other tenants. Model 3 in Table 4 includes a term 
for the interaction of the Samoan dummy variable and the natural log of the 
amount owed a t  subpoena (in constant dollars). The estimated coefficient is 
positive and is more than twice its standard error, indicating that for each unit 
increase in the amount owed the chances of eviction for Samoans increase by more 
than they do for other tenants. This means that the amount of money owed has a 
stronger effect on the probability of eviction for Samoans than it does for other 
tenants. This interaction is consistent with evidence we shall present which shows 
that the board is unwilling to accept the kinds of excuses that Samoans often give 
for high debts. Checks for interaction between the Samoan variable and other 
variables indicating case severity (percent repaid, rent delinquency history, 
appearance number) show no significant interaction. 
Tenants evicted by the hearing board can appeal to the HHA's Board of 
Commissioners. There is no overlap between the Board of Commissioners and the 
eviction board; the Commissioners are political appointees who are ultimately 
responsible for everything the HHA does. This board too proceeds informally, and 
it has discretion to allow tenants whose eviction has been ordered by the eviction 
board to stay in housing subject to whatever conditions the Commissioners choose 
to designate. To some degree, therefore, decisions of the Board of Commissioners 
can be used to replicate findings from the hearing stage. Table 5 presents probit 
models for outcomes a t  the appeal stage. Due to the smallmumber of cases 
appealed, these models include only some of the variables included in the models 
for the hearing stage. 10 
In model 1 of Table 5, the estimated effect of being Samoan on the chance of 
eviction is actually negative, but it is not statistically significant. The negative 
coefficient may be due simply to instability in the estimate caused by the fact that 
only 100 cases were available with which to estimate this model. 
In addition, the Samoan coefficient a t  the appeal stage may be negatively 
biased due to selection a t  the hearing stage. To the extent that Samoans are 
discriminated against a t  the hearing stage, evicted Samoans will be less deserving 
of eviction on variables not included in the models. If Samoans are as likely as 
non-Samoans to appeal eviction orders, their lower evictability on unmeasured 
variables would negatively bias the Samoan effect estimated for the appeal stage. 
However Samoans were more likely than other tenants to appeal eviction 
decisions, which may counteract any bias caused by discrimination a t  the hearing 
stage. l l 
A dummy variable for whether the tenant repaid all of her debt is used rather than the 
percent repaid because the exact amount owed at the time of appeal was not available and 
because in the last period, at least, tenants were told that if they could repay everything that was 
owed their appeal would almost certainly be granted. 
l1 About 52.4% of evicted Samoans appealed, but only 35.6% of non-Samoan tenants appealed. 
This difference may exist because of the close communal ties of Samoans makes them more likely 
than others to know of evicted tenants who successfully appealed or to have family or friends who 
could instruct them in the appeal process. Such a difference would also be expected if Samoans 
Model 2 in Table 4 includes a term for the interaction of the Samoan 
variable and the amount owed. The estimated coefficient is positive and 
significant a t  the .05 level (one-tailed). At the appeal stage as a t  the hearing, 
increasing indebtedness is more detrimental to Samoan than to non-Samoan 
tenants. 
Taking the quantitative analysis as a whole, it appears that Samoans 
accused of financial violations fare somewhat worse in the eviction process than 
non-Samoans accused of similar violations who are comparable on other eviction- 
relevant characteristics. We may call this Samoan disadvantage "discrimination," 
but we should be aware of precisely what this means. It means that given the 
characteristics we are able to control for, Samoans are more likely to be evicted 
than other tenants who are similar with respect to the control characteristics. 
One possible reason for this is the fact that Samoans, as we noted above, 
are socio-economically the least advantaged of the various ethnic groups that 
populate Hawaii, and they are apparently stigmatized on this account. In deciding 
whether to evict, the board members may be reacting negatively to the fact that 
Samoans are before them, or the Authority's prosecutor or manager-complainants 
may push harder for eviction in Samoan cases than when the tenants are of a 
different ethnic background. There is some evidence in interviews with 
prosecutors, project managers and board members that negative stereotypes of 
Samoans exist. 
For example, one prosecutor, talking generally about cases in which 
inoperative vehicles had been parked in project lots said he would tell' the owner of 
such a car: 
I don't care if it is up on blocks and you are going to have to have 
fifty Samoans come out and help you. carry it away - two weeks from 
now the car is gone or it is there and that is what decides whether 
you are going to stay or not stay. 
I t  is instructive that the prosecutor assumed that Samoans would be 
involved and that the solution might involve Samoan manual labor. At another 
point the same prosecutor in discussing the appeal process and the fact that a 
tenant must sign a stipulated agreement12 if she wants to stay complained: 
Yea, we would be sitting there just like you and I are talking and I 
would ask if they understand and to explain it in your own words. 
They would explain it in their own words and then we would go in 
there (the Board Room where the Commissioners sat), and they would 
had a greater ability than non-Samoans to acquire enough money to clear their rent debts because 
in the most recent periods tenants knew that a successful appeal was unlikely unless all the 
money owing was repaid. Finally the difference is consistent with apparent discrimination against 
Samoans at the hearing stage, for this discrimination means that evicted Samoans tend to owe 
less money than other evictees, which in turn suggests a greater than average ability to pay back 
what is owed and thus a greater expectation of success on appeal. 
l2 In a stipulated agreement a tenant promises to pay her rent on time for a year and agrees 
that she may be evicted without any further hearing should she violate the rent payment 
requirements or any other lease provision within that year. 
freeze up and start talking Samoan. It  was, it got ridiculous; so now 
we have a translator. 
One board chair conveyed his image of Samoans in apologizing for the fact 
that a non-payment case we observed was nothing special: 
This wasn't a very good case for you ... it was one of our real rinky 
dink cases. We didn't have the Samoans, we didn't have the 
shouting, we didn't have the language barrier, we didn't have any 
witnesses . . . 
A tenant board member when asked whether her children, who sometimes 
stayed overnight as unauthorized guests, might get her into trouble if they were 
involved in a fight replied: 
Oh yeah, but in a project like [mine], you know, we are pretty lucky. 
There are not too many [fights]. We don't have many Samoans for 
one thing ... 
When asked whether Samoans cause problems on the projects she 
continued: 
I have found in the past, yeah. I am not stigmatizing them, but I 
have found that if you get three or four of them they are apt to get 
more rambunctious - it is [true ofl any nationality, but for some 
reason Samoans I have found to be not the best people to sit down 
and drink with; so I kind of shy away from them. 
A former board member and chair in commenting on his efforts to explain to 
evicted tenants why the board had no choice but to evict them described several 
instances in which evicted tenants thanked the board: 
In fact one of them was a Samoan tenant, family. You know how 
hard they are. 
Finally, a long time project manager who was admired by tenants for his 
humaneness, commented: 
But it is true, Samoans are antagonistic or hostile. But as I say, they 
weren't my problem tenants on delinquency. I was more afraid of 
them on a physical basis where they would mug me or gang up on 
me. 
[Did anyone ever attack you?] 
No. I had one guy who verbally said, "Oh, who do you think you 
are." I don't think this prejudice is really hostile with any kind of 
base to it. Even I will say, "000, that's a wild one," or "he's a 
Samoan," but really I had Japanese who were just as ornery in 
talking to me; yeah, like any other strains. You know, it is funny, as 
I recollect, prejudice is, I think, a matter of perception or you see ... 
maybe a black guy who gets hostile and there is [nothing] there, but 
if [you see] that then I guess it exists. 
The attitudes that these remarks reflect might suggest that managers and 
prosecutors push harder for eviction when Samoans are defendants,l3 and that 
board members are more likely to hold against Samoans in close cases. But recall 
that we found only weak evidence of discrimination against Samoans in cases 
brought for non-financial reasons. If a generalized prejudice against Samoans 
were the main reason they fared worse thail other tenants in financial cases, we 
should have found that the effect was just as strong or - given the reputation of 
Samoans for violence - stronger in cases involving fighting, trouble making and 
other non-financial offenses. Moreover, in our interviews board members and 
others were more likely to comment on the special situation of Samoans than they 
were to make remarks suggesting a generalized prejudice. For example, one 
former board member when asked whether any special accommodatjons were 
made for Samoans who had, by their own lights, good cultural reasons for 
spending rent money on something else (e.g. contributing to a funeral in Samoa) 
commented: 
I think all of us had an empathy and perhaps even a sympathy for 
these folks [Samoans] because we realized that we always had to stop 
and think, well maybe they really don't understand. We always had 
to appreciate the cultural difference, and I think all of us took that 
into consideration. However, we tried to end up judging them the 
same way we would anybody else. 
If this board member is correct and the board ended up "judging [Samoans] 
the same way [it] would anybody else" it would appear that the board did not 
illegally discriminate against Samoans since illegal discrimination implies 
differential treatment on the basis of some impermissible characteristics such as 
ethnicity. Yet if there was no illegal discrimination how can one explain the 
disadvantage that attaches to Samoan status in our data? The answer we think 
lies in the differing cultural logics of Samoan tenants and eviction board members. 
What seemed natural or appropriate to Samoans did not seem natural or 
appropriate to board members. In judging Samoans like anybody else, in failing to 
take for granted what Samoan tenants took for granted, the board produced a 
The project manager's preference can influence the eviction board. In non-payment cases that 
we observed the project manager was invariably asked whether, apart from the charged lease 
violation, the tenant caused any problems. I t  may be that project managers bringing cases for 
financial reasons are more likely to tell the board that Samoan tenants have been responsible for 
other problems on the project than they are to report similar difficulties with te'nants from other 
ethnic groups. Such reports might reflect actual behavior, for the stereotypes of both tenants and 
project managers indicate that Samoans cause trouble in ways that are harder to prove than 
financial violations. 
If the board in deciding whether to evict is responding to managerial judgments of overall 
tenant character, the board is not discriminating in an invidious racial sense since regardless of 
the tenant's ethnicity the board might consider what the manager told them. However, the 
eviction process is not working legally as  it should. The board does not have the legal authority to 
evict a tenant who would otherwise have been given a second chance simply because a manager 
has made an unproven allegation that the tenant is a trouble maker. This discussion we should 
note is speculative. We have no reason in our data to believe that Samoans charged with non- 
payment of rent are evicted for reasons other than their non-payment. Lf the non-payment charge 
was a subterfuge for evicting tenants for other harder to prove reasons, we would expect Samoans 
to be particularly disadvantaged in cases where small sums of rent were owing, but the interaction 
between ethnicity and rent owed which we found runs in the opposite direction. 
pattern of decisions similar to what one might find had the board intentionally 
treated Samoan ethnicity as a factor weighing in favor of eviction. We were in our 
interviews able to identify two ways in which differing cultural logics apparently 
had this effect. 
First, Samoans were more likely than others to have some relative or friend 
speak for them. In part this was because Samoan tenants often did not speak 
English or were not confident of their English and brought translators with 
them.14 But it also reflects the fact that in Samoa there is a class of orators 
renowned for their speaking ability, who other Samoans, even high chiefs, let 
speak for them on formal occasions. Thus a Samoan would have found it natural 
to bring a fellow Samoan as a spokesperson. 
I t  is possible that it is more difficult to make a convincing case for leniency 
when it is necessary to speak through a translator. Our data do not allow us to 
evaluate this possibility. However, it seems clear that Samoans were not helped 
and were probably hurt when they brought orators to speak to the board for them. 
One tenant board member recalls how one repeat player alienated the board: 
This one particular man; he comes when there is a Samoan tenant 
who is going to face the board .... He is a talking chief15 for the 
Samoan council, but that has nothing to do with the real courts. Now 
they come in and right off the bat make accusations - that we are all 
going to.wind up in court. . ... Some of them do not want ,to reveal 
what happened.. . . 
We have seen the files on several cases in which this talking chief, also a 
public housing tenant, appeared. No doubt thinking it appropriate to the board 
setting, the talking chief acted as if he were a lawyer, making legal motions and 
arguments and threatening to go to circuit court with a variety of claims. Yet he 
had no legal training, and to a lawyer not only do his "legal" arguments appear 
hopeless, but the formality with which he tries to expound them often appears 
ludicrous. l 6  Moreover, in concentrating on pseudo-legal arguments, this chief 
neglected to make the kinds of informal explanations and arguments for leniency 
that might have persuaded the board to give the tenant a second chance. These 
are arguments which, ironically, genuine lawyers often make with some success 
(Lempert and Monsma 1988, Monsma and Lempert in press). Shortly after one of 
this talking chiefs most elaborate cases, in which he went so far as to file 
"motions" in circuit court when his "client" was evicted but then never followed 
up on his action, he himself was evicted from public housing for non-payment of 
rent. 
From our observations and conversations it appears that these were most often the tenants' 
children who had grown up in Hawaii and so were fluent in English or ministers or other church 
representatives. 
A talking chief is special in two ways in Samoa. He is both an orator and a person who can 
\ claim noble status (Grattan 1948; Holmes 1974). 
l6 The chief himself was apparently caught between two cultures. He tried to use the language 
of one culture (Western law) and the style of another (Samoan argumentation). The result was 
speech that the board members greeted with impatience and recounted with laughter. 
While we cannot be certain that the tenants this man represented would 
have done better without him, they almost certainly would not have done worse. 
If the board evicted tenants he or others like him represented when they would 
have given a second chance to similarly situated tenants who gave excuses or pled 
for mercy, the board's decisions cannot be attributed to some simple anti-Samoan 
bias since it responds to the quality of the cases presented, but Samoans are 
nonetheless disadvantaged where non-Samoan tenants would not be. This 
possibility cannot, however, explain most of the disadvantage that in our 
quantitative model seems attributable to Samoan ethnicity, for there are too few 
Samoans with such representation to account for the quantitative results. 
The second factor that we are unable to capture in our coding which might 
explain the pattern of board decision making is the quality of excuses that tenants 
make. The excuses that Samoans make may simply receive less respect, and in 
Western eyes deserve less respect, than the excuses other tenants make. Tenant 
excuses for skipping rent payments usually refer to factors beyond their control, 
such things as illness, unemployment, thefts of wallets and the like. The excuses 
Samoans offer often refer to expenditures that to Westerners seem within a 
person's control but to Samoans may seem every bit as compelling as the excuse 
that one had to pay doctors' bills. 
To put it simply, a good Samoan is a bad public housing tenant.17 For 
Samoans what is central in life is the a or extended family, the , or family 
chief, and, especially in the United States, the church (Grattan 1948, Holmes 
1974, Jane 1990). A Samoan achieves status through the &a both because the 
Samoan shares in the status of his &a and because, in the case of males, the i&ga 
chooses its own chiefs.18 The rnatai as head of the family controls all the family's 
property and allocates the family's wealth. While the degree of rnatai control over 
property has broken down in recent years as a cash economy has largely replaced 
the property-based subsistence economy in Samoa, a concomitant aspect of this 
change is that Samoans are expected to make cash contributions to their rnatai 
and @. Indeed, Samoan families often gather the money to send their relatives 
to the United States (or, in the case of Western Samoa, New Zealand) as an 
investment, with the return taking the form of regular "remittances" once the 
relatives have gotten jobs (Ala'Ilima and Stover 1986). It is particularly 
important that cash gifts be sent in connection with certain ceremonial occasions, 
especially funerals and weddings (Ablon 1971). To fail to do so would bring 
dishonor to both the individual (thus making it unlikely he will ever achieve 
chiefly status) and, if the family cannot make up the shortfall, the a. 
Moreover, a failure to contribute can lead to substantial insecurity because a 
l7 Most Samoan immigrants to the United States, including most Samoan public housing 
tenants, come from American Samoa. The portrait that follows is today truer of Western Samoa 
than it is of American Samoa, where traditions have more rapidly broken down. However, studies 
during the past twenty years of Samoans in the United States indicate that elements of the 
traditional culture persist, and they would have been more deeply rooted in the head of household 
generations a t  the time our cases arose than they were in younger, American-born generations or 
are today. 
18 In Samoa when a man marries he has a choice of living in his wife's or his own. The 
choice will often be determined by the number and quality of the older males in each &ga and 
what these imply for the person's opportunity to advance to chiefly status. 
Samoan who is a member in good standing of his or her w knows that in a crisis situation helshe can turn to family members for support. 
Samoans in the United States often have relatives living near them so the 
can in part be reconstituted in this country. However, even when there are 
numbers of relatives in the United States the larger part of the aiga and its matai 
typically are resident in Samoa. In these circumstances the chhrch steps in to fill 
gaps, and provides a general trans-family support network for its members. In 
return, however, Samoans are expected to respond to church needs in much the 
same way as they would respond to their a&& requests. This means that 
Samoan churches in the United States are another source of hard to resist 
demands for funds.20 
The result of these institutional ties is that Samoans may be pressured to 
give to the family or church money that is needed for rent. Board members can be 
particularly resentful when, as is often the case with public housing tenants, the 
money that is sent to Samoa or given to the church was money provided by 
welfare and earmarked for rent. Thus, while board members may recognize the 
special pressures that Samoans may be under, most do not regard them as 
legitimate excuses for not paying the rent. Recall the sympathetic board member 
quoted above. His bottom line was that "We tried to end up judging [Samoans] 
the same way we would anybody else." Another board member, who clearly 
recognized the cultural reasons for certain Samoan behavior patterns, similarly 
concluded: 
I think that many of the cultural things that have held up and have 
proven good in island countries cannot withstand the city .... [Mly 
feeling is . . . that if they come to this urban situation nobody is forcing 
them and they come to it; they must adjust to it. I am willing to take 
into consideration that [cultural reasons explain lease violations] but 
there comes a place where I think that they must adjust, and the two 
cultural patterns do not. 
l9 Several studies have suggested that Samoans may in certain ways show less stress than other 
immigrant groups because of the security the aiga provides (Janes 1990, Lazar 1985). 
20 There are other aspects of Samoan culture that make good Samoans poor housing tenants. 
The tremendous stress on family and a pattern of emigration in which Samoans expect to spend 
months if not years living with relatives before setting out on their own means that the pressures 
on Samoans to break guest rules in housing and to overcrowd units are undoubtedly great. 
Family ties mean that it. is very difficult if not impossible for a Samoan family to ensure that a 
project trouble maker leaves the family and does not return when the trouble maker's continued 
presence is likely to lead the Authority to seek eviction. Moreover the Samoan culture accepts 
occasional violent outbursts in men (so long as  they are not directed against Samoans of a higher 
hierarchical position) (Lazar, 1985) as natural, and the physical discipline with which Samoans 
raise their children (it is severe enough that some Westerners would see it a s  child abuse) may 
conduce to violent outbursts as  well (Baker, 1986). These features of Samoan culture, as  well as  
the generally large body size of Samoans, may explain why Samoans are often stereotyped as 
violent and feared on the projects. These aspects of Samoan culture are not discussed in the text 
because while they affect the quality of Samoans as housing tenants and may well af'fect 
stereotypical views of Samoans and what managers tell the board about tenant character, they do 
not figure directly when financial cases are a t  issue. 
Another board member was less able to empathize. She commented that as 
a board member she had learned over time to be less sympathetic to tenants, and 
when asked how she had learned to overlook the "sob stories", she made it clear 
that for her even the excuses got stale: 
Oh, well, from experience I guess. There are so many of them that 
come on and say, especially the Samoans; I mean they always say 
that they cannot pay their rent because they have to support the 
church and things like that. But after you get 10, 15 of them telling 
you the same things. .. 
[Or funerals or things like that?] 
Yea, or they gotta go home; they gotta go back to Samoa because 
somebody is sick over there or things like that. But you know when 
you come down to it, they are all on welfare, and they are using your 
money to - so you learn to become a little bit more, you know, you 
don't believe all the things that they tell you. 
Sometimes, the excuses may be unbelievable,21 but the excuses that this 
board member is talking about are credible within the context of Samoan culture 
even when they are repeated by tenant after tenant.22 Perhaps if the excuse were 
that a wallet were stolen or that a child had fallen i11,23 the board member, while 
remaining skeptical, would have been more likely to credit the tenant's reason. 
21 The Authority's only Samoan project manager in talking about the reasons Samoans give for 
not paying their rent commented: 
You know, like I had a tenant who said my uncle so and so died so I can't pay my rent this 
month, and I said, "Which uncle is that," and I wrote it down. Six months later the same tenant 
said his uncle died and I said, "Oh, which one is that." I remembered and I said, "Gee, your uncle 
died twice!" That time you tell them, "Hey, you pay it by this date or you are going up [before 
the board] for it." 
22 As with the excuses offered by non-Samoans, it is likely that some of these assertions are true 
and that others are simply a Samoan tenant's idea of what made up excuse is most likely to be 
perceived as  a reasonable justification for falling behind on the rent. In similar fashion, non- 
Samoans tenants as  a group report too many thefts of wallets or purses for all the stories of such 
losses to be true. It is difficult if not impossible, however, to sort out the true from the false. In 
these circumstances it is likely that the board members are more prone to believe excuses 
involving events or circumstances that they might experience than they are to believe an excuse 
that they would never make. 
23 Samoans are probably less likely to make illness excuses than other tenants because 
ordinarily they prefer Samoan healers to Western doctors and Samoan healers are not expensive 
(Cook 1983). Indeed, the medical setting contains an even better example of culture conflict than 
the eviction setting. Cook (1983) tells of a Samoan mother who took a sick child to a hospital 
emergency room in Hawaii. The nurse seemed to be scolding her and seemed to be handling her 
child roughly as  she felt for infected abscesses. The mother took the child from the nurse and ran 
away. The hospital called the Honolulu child protective services to try and find the mother. From 
the mother's point of view her actions were reasonable. Samoans think illness is caused by 
disharmony in the family or with God, and the nurses actions suggested there was a disharmony 
between her and the mother which further threatened the health of her child. From the nurse's 
Moreover, even a willingness to credit Samoan excuses does not mean they 
will be accepted. Some managers and board members believe that the only way 
that Samoans will learn how to be "good" housing tenants is if particularly 
Samoan excuses are not tolerated.24 As one project manager said: 
We have a lot of Samoans a t  this project, and there is a Samoan 
custom that every time somebody dies, you give money to the family 
to help bring the family over from Samoa. I have the hardest time 
trying to change that custom, but little by little. [I tell them] you 
pay your rent first, then you help the family. 
If this manager succeeds, he will be making his Samoans better public 
housing tenants but worse Samoans. And ironically, he might be depriving them 
of their ability to call upon church and family when for a good Western (or 
Samoan) reasons the family falls behind on rent and needs a lump sum to clear its 
debt. Both managers and board members report that it is not uncommon for 
Samoans who are behind on their rent to be able, once the crisis of eviction is real 
to acquire from church or family enough money to pay everything that is owing.2d 
Thus despite comments that suggest prejudice against Samoans on the part 
of some board members and Authority officials and despite data which shows that 
other measurable variables being equal Samoans fare worse than other tenants, it 
is difficult to say whether the HHA's eviction board discriminates against 
Samoans. The difficulty lies not in the opaqueness of the eviction process, for our 
combination of quantitative and qualitative data allows greater insight into what 
influences the board than students of discrimination in judicial processes ordinarily 
achieve. The difficulty exists because the Samoan example makes problematic 
what we mean. by discrimination. From a purely legal standpoint there is 
probably no discrimination, for the board members are arguably responding in the 
same way to Samoans as they would to other tenants making similar excuses. 
But other tenants seldom make similar excuses; their repertoire of stock excuses is 
different. Swidler (1986) argues that the influence of culture lies not in shaping 
the values toward which action is oriented but rather in providing a "tool kit" of 
habits, styles and skills that people can draw on to reach valued ends. The tools 
that Samoan culture provides are often ill-suited to the end of persuading the 
eviction board to leniency. Yet they are suited to other ends, such as maintaining 
status within the aiga, that Samoan tenants value. Not only do Samoan tenants 
find themselves in a dilemma that other tenants need not confront, but often, 
point of view, this was a case of child neglect. Indeed, since Samoans typically go to native 
healers first, they often bring themselves or their children to doctors only after the illness is in an 
advanced state. Doctors see this as unconscionable neglect and scold the Samoans for their 
behavior, which leaves Samoans yet less easy with their doctors. In addition, Samoan healers are 
paid only when the patient recovers. The demand of American doctors to be paid upon treatment 
is itself cause for suspicion. 
24 Cf. the treatment of witchcraft in BI-itish-ruled African colonies (Lempert & Sanders 1986, 79- 
83). 
25 It may be that those Samoan tenants who are actually brought before the eviction board 
owing rent have fewer family or church resources to draw on or that, despite their excuses, they 
have not been as good Samoans as they should have been and so are unable to benefit from 
reciprocity. 
because of the taken for granted nature of many cultural assumptions, they do not 
recognize the dilemma they are in. Samoan excuses, real or made up, do not move 
managers or board members who share a very different taken for granted world.26 
For these reasons, Samoans are disadvantaged because of their ethnic heritage as 
surely as if the board was peopled by bigots who would not give Samoans an even 
break. The Samoan disadvantage exists because Samoan tenants live in a setting 
in which the rules of another culture dominate, and they must litigate cases before 
a board whose members share the taken for granted assumptions of the dominant 
culture. It is this form of cultural domination that might be called cultural 
discrimination. 
One must, however, be cautious in assuming that the adverse outcomes 
visited on a cultural minority would be avoided if that minority were judged by its 
own cultural logic rather than that of the dominant culture. This is nicely 
illustrated by a pair of cases we discovered. 
In 1981 the Authority sought to evict a 71  year old Samoan high chief, and 
former head of Hawaii's Samoan Council of Chiefs, because one of his sons had 
stabbed and killed another man on project premises.27 This gave rise to the most 
litigated eviction action in HHA history, as the case was eventually appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Hawaii before it was finally resolved in the Authority's 
favor. The tenant had several substantial claims. First, he had obviously not 
condoned or cooperated in his son's behavior and was responsible for it only in the 
vicarious sense that the lease imposed such responsibility. Second, the chief with 
some justification could claim he had been a good tenant. Indeed, the year before 
he had been commended by the HHA and received an award from the Mayor of 
Honolulu for his part in organizing a Samoan patrol which, following the Samoan 
. custom of blowing on a conch shell, enforced a curfew on the youth who lived 
within the project. Third, the chief and his family had, following Samoan custom, 
presented themselves covered with fine mats in front of the apartment occupied by 
the family of the deceased. Eventually they had been welcomed in, a sign of 
reconciliation between the families (Filoiali'i & Knowles 1983). Finally, it was 
correctly pointed out that the son who did the killing was in prison and had no 
present prospect of returning to the project grounds. Despite these considerations 
26 One public housing manager during the later years of our time period was Samoan. He 
managed a heavily Samoan project area, and he waited longer before bringing tenants up for 
eviction than any of the other housing managers who served concurrently with him. This 
probably reflects his willingness to give credence to Samoan excuses. He was, for example, the 
manager we describe in note 21  who did not bring a tenant up for eviction the first time the tenant 
said he had sent his rent money to Samoa as a contribution to his uncle's funeral but did act six 
months late? when the tenant, repeating the same excuse for another missed payment, 
inadvertently claimed the same uncle had died. Other project managers would probably not have 
accepted the first excuse, nor had they accepted it had the foresight and suspicion to ask which 
uncle had died. In an analysis that is not reported we controlled for cases brought by this 
manager and found that his presence could not explain the negative coefficient on Samoans in our 
probit models. 
27 The chief was charged with violating one lease provision relating to unauthorized guests and 
another which requires the lessee to ensure that those on the premises with his consent conduct 
themselves in a peaceful manner. Several past incidents of intimidation involving the chiefs 
family members were alleged along with the stabbing, but the past incidents had been overlooked 
when they occurred, and it is clear that the stabbing was the reason for the action. 
and the chiefs age and status, the Authority insisted on evicting and eventually 
was able to enforce its will. The chief and his family had to leave the project 
forever. Did the board's strictness reflect an anti-Samoan bias? Would a board 
that was more genuinely appreciative of Samoan culture have decided differently? 
Let us look to Samoa. 
Less than a decade before a quite celebrated and somewhat similar case had 
arisen in the village of Sala'ilua in Western Samoa. The adult son of one of the 
village's two highest chiefs shot and killed the other highest chief following a 
quarrel. The son was arrested and taken to jail. Meanwhile in much the same 
fashion as the Hawaiian chief, the heads of the killer's family presented 
themselves wrapped in fine mats before the house of the deceased's family. 
Eventually they were invited into the house, the traditional sign of reconciliation. 
The remaining high chief had known nothing about his son's intent, and there was 
nothing he could have done to prevent the killing. Later the other chiefs of the 
village met to decide how the matter ought finally to be resolved. They ordered 
the chief who was father to the killer and all his lineal descendants to leave the 
village, never to return again (Shore 1982). 
Conclusion, 
We began this paper by noting that Samoans in Hawaii have many of the 
characteristics that are associated with an underclass. For this reason we thought . 
they might be discriminated against in the eviction hearing process. We first 
approached this question in a traditional sociological fashion. We constructed a 
model which included those variables in our data set which might, in a legal- 
normative sense, be legitimately considered by the eviction board in its decision 
making processes or which might proxy for variables that could be so considered. 
We then showed that net of these variables Samoans were more likely than 
tenants of other ethnic backgrounds to be evicted when charged with financial 
violations. Had we stopped here, which is where most studies of discrimination 
and courts stop, we would have concluded that as expected Samoans ethnicity 
triggered discriminatory decision making. 
However, we had other information available to us. First, conversations 
with wiction board members, project managers and others revealed that some of 
these people had unfavorable opinions of Samoans, but there were more managers 
and board members who claimed to appreciate the special situation of Samoans 
and to some extent expressed empathy with them. Moreover, even if generalized 
prejudice on the part of some board members and managers occasionally 
disadvantaged Samoans, the weak and nonsignificant Samoan effect among cases 
that do not involve financial debts indicates that the effect of such generalized 
prejudice is not strong and can account for only a small part of the Samoan 
disadvantage. 
Our interviews indicate instead that a large part of the disadvantage 
experienced by Samoans in the eviction process seems traceable to the fact that 
Samoans tend to excuse rent payment lapses with rationales the board will not 
accept. It is also possible that the frequency with which Sambans make 
"traditional" excuses hurts Samoans who make excuses like the "child's illness" 
excuse, which board members would ordinarily be more receptive to. This is 
because the board's general experience with Samoans may lead some board 
members to stereotype all Samoans as managing money according to the wrong 
priorities. This would be a variant of what Wilson (1991) has called "statistical 
discrimination." Our interview data neither support nor refute this possibility, 
although they do show a general willingness to stereotype Samoans. 
Our paper raises the question of whether it is discrimination to credit 
excuses that are valid within the dominant North American culture but not those 
that are only valid within Samoan culture? By the law's standard there seems to 
be no discrimination here. But in a broader, more sociological sense, one can claim 
that discrimination exists. Consider Feagin and Eckberg's definition of racial or 
ethnic discrimination as "the practices and actions of dominant race-ethnic groups 
that have a differential and negative impact on subordinate race-ethnic groups" 
(1980, p.9). By this standard Samoans clearly do face discrimination a the hands 
of the eviction board except the practices that disadvantage them are now not so 
much those associated with a dominant ethnic group (no-one ethnic group 
dominates in Hawaii and the values that underlie board decisions are broadly 
shared) as they are those associated with a world view and values common across 
modernized ethnic groups in North American society. 
Yet calling a tendency not to accept the excuses of a culturally alien 
--. subordinate group discrimination does not say what, if anything, could or should 
be done about it. One might argue, as more than one board member did, that in 
moving to the United States and accepting welfare subsidies Samoans knowingly 
entered a. system which imposed constraints on their ability to honor cultural 
obligations. Although the more extreme versions of this argument erroneously 
assume that the United States is a cultural homogeneous society and that 
Samoans are foreigners (American Samoans are U.S. citizens), it is probably true 
that movement into an alien environment inevitably requires some adaptation. 
Sensitivity to cultural differences is not just a one way street and requires 
understanding and adaptation on all sides. 
Given this, what does ensuring fair and equal treatment of Samoan tenants 
mean? Should the HHA's eviction board have continued to reject Samoan excuses 
and hoped that Samoans would learn to make rent payment a higher priority than 
cultural obligations? Should it have accepted some excuses when they were made 
by Samoans but not when they were made by other .tenants, and risked "reverse 
discrimination" lawsuits by non-Samoans who were evicted after using their rent 
money to support relative or churches? Should the board have begun accepting 
typically Samoan excuses from all tenants, and risked dramatic increases in rent 
debts owed by tenants? There is no easy answer. Cultural pluralism brings up 
important questions about what equality both sociologically and before the law 
means. As immigrants from around the world continue to arrive in the United 
States, a wide variety of tribunals are likely to face such dilemmas. 
In fact, the HHA's eviction board appears to have solved its fairness 
dilemma, although its solution was not born of a concern for fairness. By the last 
year of our time series the HHA's board had retreated into formalism. The law 
allowed tenants to be evicted whenever they were behind in their rent and the 
Authority, after years of trying, was finally able to persuade the board to adopt 
the general policy of always evicting when rent was owing regardless of the reason 
(Lempert, 1989). Under this policy Samoans are not disadvantaged vis-a-vis other 
tenants by the quality of their excuses. Excuses have ceased to count. But 
Samoans may still be disadvantaged in housing if their culture leads them to give 
or lend money and consequently owe rent when other tenants would not.28 
Formalism by silencing excuses renders this disadvantage invisible.29 
It is clear that to determine whether the eviction board we studied 
discriminates, we must first ask what we mean by discrimination and what are 
the standards by which we measure it. Should we also ask these questions in 
studies of formal courts that seek evidence of discrimination? We think so. Can 
we answer them if all we have is the kind of archival data that courts routinely 
collect? Only, our experience in Hawaii suggests, if we are willing to accept 
impoverished and perhaps misleading answers. 
28 Conversely they may be advantaged if when they fall behind on their rent for reasons like 
unemployment or illness they can call on their church or aiga for financial assistance. Whether 
Samoans as  a group are in fact disadvantaged vis-a-vis other tenants depends on the balance 
between the resources that Samoans give to the aiga and church and those that they receive from 
these sources. This balance may, however, depend Qn the Authority's institutional arrangements. 
The speed with which the Authority processed evictions in the most recent years of our time series 
may have prevented Samoan tenants from receiving support that would have been available given 
enough time. 
29 There is another aspect of formalism that deserves mention. Even had the eviction board 
retained discretion to refrain from evicting when money was owing, the situation we describe 
might have been different had the board been a formal legal tribunal. When a party confronts a 
formal tribunal she has reason to know that the language of tribunal proceedings is unlikely to be 
her own. Formality is a cue to acquire representatives, in the case of a tribunal they are usually 
lawyers, whose expertise consist of having mastered the language and rules of the tribunal. An 
informal tribunal provides no such cues, for it purportsto speak and hear the language of the 
parties before it. For most HHA tenants this was a fair representation, but for Samoans different 
cultural assumptions meant that the board's informality was to some extent an illusion. A more 
formal scheme, with provision for legal representation, would - if it did not bring with it an 
aggregate disadvantage for all tenants - have served them better. 
Table 1. Distribution of Reason for Subpoena among Samoans 
and Others. 
Reason Samoans Others 
1. fraud 10.3% 8.3% 
2. nonpayment 78.5 72.6 
.3. guests 3.8 4.2 
4. pets 1.9 6.2 
5. other trouble 5.4 8.7 
total 
N 
Chi-Square = 12.08, 4 d.f. 
Table 2. Abbreviations and Descriptions of Variables. 
Abbreviation Description 
~ ~ ~ e a r a n c &  Number of eviction actions brought against tenant, including 
the current appearance. 
Children Number of children living with tenant. 
Finanprb Financial problem index. Nu,mber of financial problems in 
family. Occurrence of unemployment, substantial debt, illness, 
or garnished wages each add 1 point to the index. 
Incvalid Coded 1 if family income information is not missing, 0 if it is 
missing. 
Lnfaminc Natural log of family income (in constant 1982-84 dollars). 
Lnrntowed Natural log of constant 1982-84 dollars owed a t  the time of 
subpoena. 
Outcome Coded 1 if tenant was evicted, 0 if tenant was allowed to stay 
(including cases in which tenant was technically evicted but 
. 
enforcement of order was stayed). 
Pctpaid Percent of rent debt a t  time of subpoena paid before the 
hearing. 
Period Time period. 1 = 1966-74, 2 = 1975-77, 3 = 1978-79, 
4 = Hearing Officer A, 5 = Hearing Officer B, 6 = Hearing Officer 
C. 
bason  Reason for subpoena. 1 =falsification, fraud or miscel.laneous 
(generally technical), 2 = nonpayment, 3 = guests, 4 = pets, 
5 = other trouble behavior. 
Rntdel2yr Substantial rent delinquency. Coded 1 if tenant has more than 
2 years of rent delinquency history, 0 otherwise. 
Samoan Coded 1 if family is all or part Samoan, 0 otherwise. 
Table 3. Probit Model Predicting Outcome a t  Hearing among 












(5. other trouble) 
Children 
Finanprb 
Periods 1-3 * Finanprb 
Samoan 
Likelihood ratio 
. . chi-square 
Notes: N=142. Cases are weighted. Outcome coded 1 
if tenant was evicted, 0 otherwise. T-ratios are in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Probit Models Predicting Outcome a t  Hearing among Nonpayment 

















Periods 1-3 * Finanprb 
Reason 1 * Lnrntowed 
Reason 2*Lnrntowed 
Pctpaid 





Incvalid * Lnfaminc 
Samoan 
Periods 1-3 "Samoan 
Period 4" Samoan 




Notes: N = 620. Cases are weighted. Outcome coded 1 if tenant was evicted, 
0 otherwise. T-ratios are in parentheses. 
Table 5. Probit Models Predicting Outcome a t  Appeal among 
















chi-square 57.37 61.49 
Note: N= 100. Cases are weighted. Outcome coded 1 if tenant was 
evicted, 0 if tenant was allowed to stay. T-ratios in parentheses. 
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